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Abstract 
The human voice conveys a variety of information about people’s feelings, emotions and 
mental states. Some of this information relies on sophisticated Theory of Mind (ToM) skills, 
while others are more simple and do not require ToM. This variety provides an interesting 
test case for the ToM account of autism, which would predict greater impairment as ToM 
requirements increase. In this paper, we draw on psychological and pragmatic theories to 
classify vocal cues according to the amount of mindreading required to identify them. 
Children with a high functioning Autism Spectrum Disorder and matched controls were 
tested in three experiments where the speakers’ state had to be extracted from their 
vocalizations. Although our results confirm that people with autism have subtle difficulties 
dealing with vocal cues, they show a pattern of performance that is inconsistent with the 
view that atypical recognition of vocal cues is caused by impaired ToM. 
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1. Introduction 
Impaired Theory of Mind (ToM) has been described as one of the core deficits behind the 
communicative and social impairments in Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD). More 
specifically, by preventing access to the full range of mental states and efficient mindreading, 
a deficit in ToM would lead to abnormalities in social development, in communicative 
development, in empathy and in imitation, all of which require taking other people’s 
perspective  (Baron-Cohen, 1995, 2000). Deficits in ToM have been evidenced using a 
variety of techniques and tasks among which first- (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985) and 
second-order false belief tasks (Bowler,  1992;  Ozonoff,Pennington, & Rogers, 1991; 
Ozonoff, Rogers, & Pennington, 1991) as well as other tests designed for older and higher 
functioning individuals who typically pass standard false-belief tasks (Baron-Cohen, 
O'Riordan, Stone, Jones, & Plaisted, 1999; Happé, 1994). Recent tests of ToM have 
concentrated on participants’ ability to recognise mental or emotional states from information 
conveyed in the eye region or voice (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001; 
Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, & Jolliffe, 1997; Golan, Baron-Cohen, Hill, & Rutherford, 2007; 
Rutherford, Baron-Cohen, & Wheelwright, 2002).  
 
 In particular, the understanding of feelings, emotions or mental states conveyed in the voice 
provides an interesting test case for the ToM account of autism. Indeed, these types of vocal 
cues are extremely diverse (for a review, see McCann & Peppé, 2003) and call up ToM to a 
varying degree, ranging from simple physical states –such as calm or excited– that do not 
require any mindreading, to social emotions –such as embarrassment– that require first-
order ToM, and even more complex cues –like irony– requiring a full fledged 2nd-order ToM. 
This variety provides a good test case for the ToM account of autism. Indeed, according to 
this theory, participants with an ASD should be more impaired as ToM requirements 
increase.  
 
So far, however, this factor has not been controlled for and this might account for mixed 
results in the existing literature on vocal emotion recognition in autism. On the one hand, a 
host of studies highlight difficulties in detecting vocal cues to irony and sarcasm (Wang, 
Dapretto, Hariri, Sigman, & Brookheimer, 2001; Wang, Lee, Sigman, & Dapretto, 2006, 
2007), and in matching vocally expressed affects with a static or dynamic facial expression 
(Hobson, Ouston, & Lee, 1988; Loveland, et al., 1995) or with line drawings of body postures 
and facial expressions (Hobson, 1986). On the other hand, other studies show no deficits in 
recognising facial emotions (Buitelaar, Van der Wees, Swaab-Barneveld, & Van der Gaag, 
1999; Grossman, Klin, Carter, & Volkmar, 2000), vocal emotions (Boucher, Lewis, & Collis, 
2000), or in matching faces and voices in video segments (Loveland, et al., 1997). Within a 
single test, it was also found that some items trigger important differences between controls 
and adults with ASD, whilst others are not discriminant (Golan, Baron-Cohen, & Hill, 2006; 
Golan, et al., 2007; Kleinman, Marciano, & Ault, 2001; Rutherford, et al., 2002). 
 
In this paper, we draw on psychological research and pragmatic theory to distinguish various 
categories of vocal cues as a function of the amount of mindreading required to identify 
them. This analysis allows us to arrange vocal cues on a single continuum that can 
adequately test the hypothesis according to which deficits in reading the mind in the voice 
are caused by a ToM deficit.  
 
1.1 Mindreading, pragmatics and emotion recognition. 
Here we aim to organize vocal cues that are currently studied in the experimental literature 
according to the amount of mindreading required to identify them. We begin with the 
recognition of manners of speech, which relies on the mere identification of external cues. 
For example, recognising that someone is stuttering or shouting depends on the detection of 
specific acoustic cues (atypical speech rate or increased intensity, respectively). Though 
stuttering may be symptomatic of an internal state of stress, and shouting of an internal state 
of anger, it is nonetheless possible to detect a stutter or a shout without possessing the 
concept of stress or anger.  
 
Vocal cues to physical states – our second category – such as tiredness or drunkenness, by 
contrast, provide evidence for specific internal states. Recognising that someone sounds 
tired thus requires the ability to retrieve specific acoustic information (lower pitch and 
amplitude) and to link this to the appropriate internal physical state (e.g., the speaker is 
tired). Note that these first two categories both relate to non-mental states and, as such, 
should be identifiable in the absence of any capacity to mindread; they differ in that vocal 
cues in the second category, but not the first, are linked to the recognition of an internal 
(physical) state.  
 
By contrast, our third through fifth categories – basic emotions, social emotions and certain 
types of speaker’s attitude – all relate to internal mental states.  These three categories are 
further distinguished in terms of the different orders of metarepresentational ability they 
require. A metarepresentational ability is an ability to think about representations with a 
conceptual content - one’s own thoughts and those of others, for instance (Noh, 2001; 
Sperber, 2000; Wilson, 2000). A prime example of a metarepresentational ability is ToM. As 
 we will show, some mental states (basic emotions) are automatically detected independently 
of ToM, some (social emotions) depend on first-order ToM (and hence require a first-order 
metarepresentational ability), and others (expressions of speakers’ attitudes to thoughts 
attributed to others) require second-order ToM.  
 
The recognition of basic emotions (such as fear, anger, sadness, happiness and disgust), 
our third category, does not necessarily require any metarepresentational ability. To identify 
fear or anger, it is not mandatory to represent what the experiencer is thinking, but merely to 
relate external cues to the corresponding mental states (Ekman, Sorenson, & Friesen, 
1969). In line with this claim, it has been demonstrated that non-human mammals who are 
clearly unable to represent the contents of others’ thoughts can nonetheless recognise basic 
emotions (Tate, Fischer, Leigh, & Kendrick, 2006). Furthermore, infants become sensitive to 
these emotions well before they can pass any sort of ToM test. By about 4 to 6 months of 
age, they come to distinguish basic emotions and respond differentially to faces showing 
different emotions (e.g., neutral, happy, sad) (Izard, 1994; Serrano, Iglesias, & Loeches, 
1992). By about 9 to 12 months, they even start seeking out emotional information from 
other people’s faces when they feel unsure about the valence of a stimulus (Moore & 
Corkum, 1994). 
 
Social emotions, our fourth category, have been described as more “complex” than basic 
emotions, and are indeed acquired later in development (Tracy & Robins, 2004). Crucially 
for our point, recent work indicates that recognition of social, but not basic, emotions is 
linked to ToM, both in typical development and in ASD (Heerey, Keltner, & Capps, 2003). 
There is also evidence that basic and social emotions activate different neural networks, with 
the latter prompting more activity in areas implicated in ToM (Moll, et al., 2002; Takahashi, et 
al., 2008). Finally, whereas basic emotions spring from situations, memories, or perceptions 
that have immediate personal relevance, social emotions are linked to other people’s point 
of view (Haidt, 2003; Tracy & Robins, 2004) and experiencing them thus requires some 
degree of perspective taking, which is itself intimately linked to 1st order ToM. Thus, both the 
experience of social emotions and the ability to recognise them in others requires 1st-order 
ToM. This feature could also be related to the fact that social emotions involve genuinely 
propositional attitudes, i.e. attitudes to mentally represented states of affairs, and are thus 
necessarily metarepresentational in nature. One cannot simply be ashamed or 
embarrassed: one has to be ashamed of some state of affairs that one has in mind, or 
embarrassed about some mentally represented state of affairs. By contrast, basic emotions 
do not necessarily have this characteristic: One can just feel happy or sad without being 
happy or sad about some mentally represented state of affairs.  
 
Whereas first-order ToM makes it possible to attribute to others beliefs that may differ from 
one’s own, second-order ToM makes it possible to attribute beliefs about the beliefs of 
others that may differ from one’s own (Wilson, 2000), and is crucial to our fifth, and last, 
category. Understanding an utterance that expresses the speaker’s attitude to a thought 
attributed to someone else should therefore require an extra layer of metarepresentation. To 
illustrate, consider the utterances in (1) and (2). To understand (1), the hearer needs to 
attribute to Mary the thought that it will rain tomorrow: that is, to represent Mary’s thought. To 
understand (2), the hearer needs to attribute to Mary a thought about John’s thoughts: that 
is, to represent a thought about another thought.   
 
(1) Mary believes that it will rain tomorrow. 
(2) Mary thinks that John believes that it will rain tomorrow. 
 
It has been argued that this higher order ToM is needed to understand irony and other 
related phenomena (Carston, 2002; Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995). To illustrate, consider 
example (3b), uttered in the deadpan tone of voice typical of irony:  
 
 (3)  a. Bill (before the lecture): This will be a really good lecture. 
 b. Jane (later, sarcastically): That was a great lecture. 
 
Sperber and Wilson (Sperber & Wilson, 1981, 1986/1995) argue that in uttering (3b), Jane is 
metarepresenting a thought she attributes to Bill (i.e. the thought that the lecture would be 
great), and expressing her own sceptical, mocking or contemptuous attitude towards it. 
Recognising Jane’s intended meaning therefore requires the ability to understand that she is 
expressing a thought (or attitude) about an attributed thought. Experimental studies have 
indeed confirmed that performance on 2nd order ToM tasks is a good predictor of irony 
comprehension, both in typical and atypical development and in children with ASD (e.g., 
Adachi, et al., 2004; Happé, 1993; Langdon, Davies, & Coltheart, 2002). 
 
Irony is only one of many types of case where recognising the speaker’s intended meaning 
requires higher-order metarepresentational skills. Suppose, for instance, that Peter and Mary 
have gone out to see a film and, as they come out of the cinema, the following exchange 
occurs (example taken from Wilson, 2000): 
 
(4) Peter: That was a fantastic film. 
Mary:  [puzzled] Fantastic? 
 
In (4), Mary echoes Peter’s utterance not in order to agree or disagree with it, but in order to 
indicate that she is wondering about it. She thus expresses an attitude towards a thought 
she attributes to Peter. Just like ironical statements, then, so-called echoic questions require 
second-order ToM (Blakemore, 1994; Noh, 1998; Wilson, 2000). Another example of such 
dissociations between content and speaker’s attitude can be found in some instances of 
echoic negation, as in the following exchange (5):  
 
(5) Peter: You look happy! 
Mary: I’m not happy, I’m ecstatic. 
 
These utterances involving metalinguistic negations are typically pronounced with a specific 
contradiction intonation contour (involving a final rise within the negative clause) and 
contrastive stress on the offending item (here, “happy”) and on its correction (here, 
“ecstatic”) in the second clause (Carston, 1996, 2002; Horn, 1985; Iwata, 1998). Here, Mary 
indicates her attitude (here, one of rejection) to a thought she attributes to Peter (i.e., the 
thought that Mary is happy).  
 
Ironical utterances, echoic questions and metalinguistic negations all exhibit the same 
feature: an utterance (or part of an utterance) is used not to express the speaker’s own 
thought, but to metarepresent a thought she attributes to someone else (or to herself at 
another time), and to convey her own actual attitude to the content of that thought (Noh, 
2001; Wilson, 2000, 2006, in press). In each case, two orders of metarepresentational ability 
are required to recognise the speaker’s meaning. 
 
As this analysis makes clear, vocal cues provide several different types of evidence. Some 
reveal no more than the manner in which speech is produced, while others reveal underlying 
physical or mental states. Moreover, the cues that provide evidence of underlying mental 
states require different orders of metarepresentational or mindreading ability: some (basic 
emotions) require no mindreading ability at all, others (social emotions) require first-order 
mindreading ability, while still others (2nd order attitudes) require second-order mindreading 
ability. We might therefore expect these different categories of vocal cue to be processed in 
different ways. 
 
 
 
 1.2 Goals of the present paper 
In this paper, we aim to test whether participants with an ASD are more impaired in 
processing vocal cues that rely on ToM. We present an experimental procedure designed so 
that: All categories of vocal cues can be compared, both reaction times and accuracy rates 
are measured, no complicated vocabulary is used, a satisfactory number of items is 
included, and content effects are overridden. Experiment 1 assesses the ability to recognise 
manners of speech, physical states, basic emotions, social emotions and 2nd order mental 
states solely from vocal cues, and compares performances in ASD and TD participants. 
Experiments 2 and 3 then investigate the potential use of compensatory strategies in the 
ASD group. Following the ToM account, participants in the ASD group should have lower 
performance rates and slower reaction times in conditions requiring mentalising (social 
emotions and 2nd order condition) but control-like performances for non-mentalistic items 
(manners of speech, physical states, and basic emotions). 
 
2. Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 assesses the ability to take a variety of vocal cues into account in order to 
retrieve information about the speaker’s physical or mental state. Sentences with a neutral 
content and a marked prosodic contour were presented to the participant, who then had to 
pick the follow-up sentence – out of two – which best describes the way the speaker feels. 
For example, the item “Ben hears a big noise from his neighbours’ house. He says: What is 
that noise?” was presented, followed by two possible choices: “Ben is scared. There might 
be a burglar in his neighbours’ house!” and “Ben is angry. He doesn’t like it when his 
neighbours are too noisy.” To ensure that there was no content effect, each sentence was 
associated with two distinct intonation types (appearing in different lists). In our example, the 
target sentence (in italics) could be uttered either with a stutter or in a singing voice. 
Reaction times and accuracy rates were measured in five conditions: i) Manners of speech 
condition, ii) Physical states condition, iii) Basic emotions condition, iv) Social emotions 
condition, and v) the 2nd order condition. 
 
2.1 Methods 
2.1.1 Participants 
Thirty-four male adolescents (17 with ASD and 17 Typically Developing, henceforth TD) took 
part in Experiment 1. The pupils with ASD were at special education schools in England 
which require formal diagnosis of an ASD according to standard clinical criteria (APA, 1994). 
The diagnostic information was gathered from school files of documented medical diagnoses 
made by a clinical psychologist and/or psychiatrist. The controls were seen in a regular 
school. TD and ASD participants all spoke English at home, and none had any significant 
hearing loss, visual impairment, or major physical disability. The control group was matched 
on chronological age (ASD-Mean = 13;8, TD-Mean = 14;2) and verbal mental age 
(Standardised BPVS score: ASD-Mean = 106, TD-Mean = 100, see Table 1 for detailed 
information).  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
We also matched our samples on their ability to discriminate pitch, duration and intensity 
using Dorothy Bishop’s Dinos tasks (for previous studies using the Dinos task, see, e.g. 
Jones, et al., 2009; Sutcliffe & Bishop, 2005). Two dinosaurs each make a sound separated 
by a 500ms interval in the intensity and duration tasks and by a 480ms interval in the 
frequency task. The child then has to decide which dinosaur is making the longest, loudest 
or highest sound (depending on whether she is completing the duration, intensity or 
frequency task, respectively). Correct responses in this task are reinforced with a small icon 
on the screen and a cheerful noise, and wrong answers with a cross and a sigh noise. The 
next trial starts after a 500ms interval. All three tasks are based on a “more virulent” PEST 
procedure (Findlay, 1978), which adaptively alters the gap separating the two sounds. 
Initially, the participant has to make very easy discriminations, and difficulty is gradually 
 increased until an error is made. When an error is made, the discrimination is made easier. 
The task is stopped after 6 reversals have occurred or a maximum of 40 trials has been 
completed. The PEST procedure is set to converge on the 75% correct point and the 
threshold is taken as the average target across the last four reversals in the track. Minimum 
discrimination thresholds for the three Dinos tasks are shown in Table 2. Note that low 
thresholds are indicative of optimal performance.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
2.1.2 Material and design 
Design. Each target sentence was followed by two options and preceded by a sentence 
setting up a little context designed to make the sentence as natural as possible. Each item 
was associated with two different prosodic cues and two different possible answers. Each 
item could be associated with either answer, depending on the prosodic cue that was used. 
Two lists were set up, each including all 32 items pronounced in one of their prosodic form 
only. Depending on the prosodic cue, one option was correct and the other incorrect. This 
design allowed us to ensure that the participants’ responses could not be influenced by the 
semantic content of the item and that they had to rely solely on vocal cues. Thirty-two items 
were included in the study. The 2nd order condition included 8 items, and all other conditions 
included 6 items (for a detailed list of stimuli, see Appendix A). 
 
Auditory stimuli. The stimuli were recorded in an anechoic chamber at University College 
London with the help of a professional acoustician. The speaker was a native male speaker 
of Southern standard British English, trained to record auditory stimuli. He sat in an armchair 
equipped with a headrest ensuring that the distance between his mouth and the microphone 
remained constant. The microphone (Bruel & Kjaer 2231 Sound Level Meter fitted with a 
Type 4165 Microphone) was linked up to a Sony DAT reader connected to a PC. The 
recordings were made in a mono format, using a 44.1 kHz sampling rate. The items to be 
read were presented on a suspended computer screen using ProRec version 1.0© 
(Huckvale, 2003). The wave files were then segmented using the Speech Filing System© 
(Huckvale, 2004) and a 100 ms silence was inserted immediately before and after the sound 
signal. 
 
Testing. The experiment was presented using a laptop and the sounds were played through 
Sennheiser headphones that were calibrated for consistency of dB before use. None of the 
children had problems agreeing to wear the headphones and all of them were comfortable 
with computers. 
 
2.1.3 Procedure 
Written parental consent was obtained prior to the testing phase and children were then 
asked for oral assent. Pupils were seen individually at school, in a quiet room. The 
experiment started with the following instructions, which were presented on the screen and 
read out loud to the participant:  
 
You are going to hear a man called Ben talking and you will need to pick the 
sentence which describes best the way he feels. For example, if Ben sounds sad, 
you will need to pick the description which says that Ben is sad. You will need to 
choose between two sentences: one description will be written in red, and one 
description will be written in blue. If you think the best description is the red one, 
press the RED button, if you think the best description is the blue one, press the 
BLUE button. 
 
The instructions were followed by a three trial training phase after which the participant could 
ask questions. The experimental phase then started. When participants were halfway 
through the task, the message “You’re half way through!” was displayed so that they had the 
 opportunity to take a break. Each trial started with a 1000ms “Listen carefully” screen 
followed by an auditory stimulus. The participant then had to answer using one of two 
response keys (E and P counterbalanced) and the next trial started 1000ms later. The trials 
were presented in a random order. 
 
2.2 Data analysis for Experiments 1 to 3 
The data was analysed using Statistica 7.1. For all reaction time analysis, a log 
transformation was carried out beforehand to improve the conformity of the data to the 
standard assumptions of ANOVA (e.g., Howell, 1997). Reaction times of more than three 
standard deviations from the mean were considered outliers and were excluded from both 
the reaction time and the choice proportion analysis. Moreover, only correct responses were 
retained in the reaction time analysis. Effect sizes were also calculated using r². Following 
Cohen (1988), an r² above .010 reflects a small effect, an r² above .059 reflects a medium 
effect, and an r² above .138 reflects a large effect. Mixed repeated measures ANOVA with 
two factors were conducted: the within-subject factors “Prosodic-Cue” (5: speech manners, 
physical states, basic emotions, social emotions and 2nd order mental states) and the 
between subject factor “Group” (2: TD, ASD). The dependent variable was either the rate of 
correct responses or reaction times. All p-values assume a two-tailed test. 
 
2.3 Results 
Interestingly, the pattern of performances in the various conditions reflected the one 
predicted by our theoretical distinctions: Manners of speech were easiest to detect (Mean = 
91.1), followed by the other non-mentalistic category (Physical states Mean = 83.2). The 
three mental categories became harder as the number of metarepresentations needed to 
retrieve the information increased. For basic emotions, percentage of correct responses 
went down to 76.8; social emotions, which require first order ToM, came next (Mean = 74.8), 
followed by 2nd order stimuli (Mean = 70.1), the hardest category (see Figure 1). A 
Spearman rank order correlation confirms this gradual decrease of performance as the 
complexity of mentalising increases, r = -.34; p < .0001.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The ANOVA reveals a main effect of Prosodic-Cue, F(4,128) = 9.5, p < .001; r² = .22. Post 
hoc Tukey tests indicate that the Manners of speech condition was easier than all the others, 
all ps < .05. The Physical states condition also differed from all conditions, all ps < .05, 
except for the basic emotions condition for which there was only a trend, p = .09. However, 
there was no significant main effect of the group, F (1,32) = 0.13, p = .72; r² = .004, and no 
Prosodic-Cue X Group interaction, F (4,128) = 0.03, p = .99; r² = .001. We then turned to a 
more detailed analysis in order to determine whether ASD participants and TD participants 
not only had similar global performances, but also similar patterns of successes and 
difficulties. With this goal in mind, we compared ASD and TD performances for each item 
and checked whether patterns of performances correlated. A strong correlation was found 
between ASD and TD participants’ performances, r = 0.66; p < .0001; r² = 0.44. Strong 
correlations between the two groups were also found when each condition was considered 
(Manners of speech: r = 0.86; p < .001; r² = 0.74; Basic Emotions : r = 0.64; p < .05; r² = 
0.41; Social Emotions: r = 0.61; p < .05; r² = 0.37; 2nd Order Mental States: r = 0.64; p < .01; 
r² = 0.41;), with the exception of the Physical States condition (r = 0.39; p = .22; r² = 0.15). 
This indicates that items that were difficult for one group were also difficult for the other 
group; and, conversely, that items that were easy for one group were also easy for the other 
group. 
 
Furthermore, the analysis of reaction times reveals a pattern similar to that observed for 
accuracy rates, with a main effect of Prosodic-Cue, F(4,128) = 5.47, p < .001; r² = .15, no 
main effect of group, F (1,32) = 0.04, p = .85; r² = .001, and no Prosodic-Cue X Group 
 interaction, F (4,128) = 0.64, p = .63; r² = .019, which suggests that both groups of 
participants processed the stimuli at similar speeds. 
 
2.4 Discussion 
The data collected in Experiment 1 highlight the relevance of the theoretical distinction made 
in the introduction. Indeed, the pattern of accuracy rates in response to the various 
categories of vocal cues parallels distinctions based on prerequisites for mindreading. More 
surprisingly, though, ASD participants were unimpaired in all conditions. First, ASD and TD 
participants were as accurate in processing all sorts of prosodic cues, including those 
requiring greater metarepresentational abilities. Second, the pattern of performance covaried 
in both groups, so that items which triggered low (or high) performances in one group also 
triggered low (or high) performances in the other group. Third, ASD participants were as fast 
as TD participants in making their judgments. Overall, these results appear to contradict the 
idea that individuals with an ASD have a specific impairment in recognising ToM related 
emotions.  
 
One way to account for these data is to argue that, whilst failures at pragmatic tasks indicate 
pragmatic deficits, passes do not necessarily reflect underlying competence and might 
reflect the use of compensatory strategies. The rationale for this line of argument is that 
people with ASD, being particularly verbally able, can explicitly reason about the mental 
states of others, whilst being unable to mentalise in a more intuitive fashion (Fisher, Happé, 
& Dunn, 2005; Happé, 1995). This line of reasoning also applies to our data: although 
performance is very similar across groups, one cannot exclude the possibility that ASD and 
TD participants resort to different underlying cognitive mechanisms to make their judgments, 
and rely on compensatory strategies which lead them to be as accurate and efficient as the 
controls. This claim has several consequences. First, if compensatory mechanisms are 
used, it should be possible to disrupt them by making the task more demanding. For 
instance, individuals with an ASD who do pass 2nd order ToM tasks often remain impaired in 
more subtle tests (e.g., Baron-Cohen, et al., 2001; Happé, 1994). Second, if such 
compensatory mechanisms are rooted in high verbal skills, performance in pragmatic tasks 
should correlate with measures of verbal intelligence (Fisher, et al., 2005; Happé, 1995). 
Finally, compensatory strategies are likely to be less efficient than genuine competence and 
should thus give rise to slower reaction times. Such claims have rarely been directly tested 
empirically and are addressed in Experiment 2.  
 
3. Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 assesses the ability to recognise a variety of vocal cues whilst involved in a 
dual task. Participants’ first task was to decide – as fast as they could – whether or not they 
had heard the sound “ing” in the spoken stimulus. The interfering task was presented as the 
primary task and the emotional task was presented as the secondary task. If ASD 
participants rely on compensatory strategies to make up for an impaired ToM, they should 
be slower in conditions where mindreading is essential (Social Emotions and 2nd Order 
Mental States); following the disruption caused by the dual task, their accuracy rates in those 
conditions should drop; finally, their performance should correlate with verbal intelligence.  
 
3.1 Methods 
3.1.1 Participants 
Forty male adolescents (20 with AS and 20 TD) took part in Experiment 2. Inclusion and 
matching criteria were identical to those used in Experiments 1 (see Tables 1 and 2 for 
detailed information). 
 
3.1.2 Materials 
The same auditory stimuli and materials were used in Experiments 1 and 2. However, given 
that Experiment 2 was more demanding, we decided to reduce the number of trials and 
 excluded half of the items (see Appendix A: starred items appear in all three experiments). 
Items which had elicited the poorest rates of performance in the TD group were excluded.  
 
3.1.3 Procedure 
The experiment started with the instructions for the Detection task:  
 
You’re going to listen to two men talking. Your job is to say whether you heard 
them pronounce the sound “ing”. Answer as fast as you can! Ready? 
 
This was followed by a four trial training phase. After this phase, the second task (the 
Emotion task) was introduced in the same way as in Experiment 1. The rest of the procedure 
was identical to the one used in Experiment 1. Throughout the whole procedure, participants 
first had to say whether or not they had heard the sound “ing” by pressing “yes” or “no” on 
the keyboard. They received feedback on their speed and accuracy immediately after 
providing their answer. The feedback screen remained for 1 second and was followed by the 
emotion question.  
 
3.2.1 Results Task 1: Detecting the sound “ing” 
A one way ANOVA comparing rates of correct answers in the ASD (Mean = 89 %) and TD 
(Mean = 93 %) groups indicates no significant difference, F (1,38) = 2.46, p = .13; r² = .06. 
The same analysis for reaction times also reveals no group differences (ASD Mean = 4225 
ms, TD Mean = 3711 ms, F (1,38) = 0.36, p = .55; r² = .009).  
 
3.2.2 Results and discussion Task 2: External and mental state recognition 
As in Experiment 1, manners of speech were easiest to detect (Mean = 96.3), followed by 
the other categories requiring no mindreading (Physical states Mean = 83.8; Basic Emotions 
Mean = 88.4). The categories requiring first or second order ToM were the hardest (Social 
Emotions Mean = 75.0; 2nd Order Mental States Mean = 77.7) (see Figure 2). As in 
Experiment 1, a Spearman rank order correlation confirms that there is a gradual decrease 
of performance as the complexity of mentalising increases, r = -.37; p < .0001.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The ANOVA revealed a main effect of Prosodic-Cue, F(4,152) = 5.7, p < .001; r² = .13) but 
no significant main effect of the group, F (1,38) = 0.08, p = .78; r² = .002, and no Prosodic-
Cue X Group interaction, F (4,152) = 0.11, p = .98; r² = .003. As in Experiment 1, the 
performances of ASD and TD participants correlate, r = 0.38; p < .05; r² = 0.14, which 
indicates similar patterns of successes and difficulties in both groups. 
 
As in Experiment 1, the analysis of reaction times reveals a main effect of Prosodic-Cue, F 
(4,144) = 2.86, p < .05; r² = .07. There was also no Group X Prosodic Cue interaction, F (4, 
144) = 0.69, p = .60; r² = .018 and no main effect of group, F (1,36) = 0.00, p < .98; r² = 
.0001, which indicates that ASD participants provided their answers as quickly as TD 
participants. 
 
Finally, we found that global performance did not correlate with BPVS scores in the ASD 
group, r = 0.24; p = .30; r² = .06, or in the TD group, r = -0.12; p = .64; r² = .03. The same 
pattern was found for reaction times, ASD group: r = 0.02; p = .94; r² = .0003; TD group: r = 
0.31; p = .19; r² = .10. 
 
3.3 Discussion 
In Experiment 2, we tested participants’ ability to identify vocal cues whilst they were 
engaged in a secondary task. By doing so, we aimed to uncover potential compensatory 
strategies which may have masked differences in Experiment 1. The use of compensatory 
strategies has several testable consequences. First, an increase in task difficulty should lead 
 to worse performances in conditions requiring mindreading. Second, performance should 
correlate with measures of verbal intelligence. Finally, since compensatory strategies are, by 
nature, less efficient than the actual cognitive process they replace, participants who 
resorted to compensatory strategies (here, ASD participants) should be slower in conditions 
requiring ToM abilities.  
 
None of these predictions was supported. In spite of the increased cognitive demands 
imposed by the dual task, ASD participants were as accurate and fast as the controls; they 
had the same pattern of strengths and deficits; and finally, performances did not correlate 
with measures of verbal intelligence in either group. The two groups also had similar 
performances in the interfering task, which implies that the lack of difference in the emotion 
task is unlikely to be due to ASD participants being less attentive in the interfering task. 
Together with Experiment 1, these results suggest that the participants with ASD included in 
our study are capable of genuinely “reading the mind in the voice”. An alternative possibility, 
though, is that the task was not challenging enough to pinpoint a subtle, but existing, deficit. 
In Experiment 2, everything was indeed done to ensure that the dual task was easy and 
engaging for the children. Observation during the experimental session and also debriefing 
confirmed that participants in both groups enjoyed the task and got excited about using the 
feedback screen to try and beat their own speed record. Because the participants included in 
this study were all high functioning, it is possible that their emotion recognition deficit is 
restricted to challenging situations. In Experiment 3, we address this possibility. 
 
4. Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 assesses the ability to detect and interpret a variety of vocal cues whilst 
involved in a highly demanding dual task. Participants were asked to concentrate on the 
number of times they heard the letter T in the utterance whilst also having to monitor the 
speaker’s emotional state. The interfering task (counting Ts) was presented as the primary 
task and the emotional task was presented as the secondary task. The predictions were 
identical to those made in Experiment 2: If ASD participants rely on compensatory strategies 
to make up for an impaired ToM, they should be slower in conditions where mindreading is 
essential (Social Emotions and 2nd Order Mental States); following the disruption caused by 
the dual task, their accuracy rates in those conditions should drop; and finally, their 
performance should correlate with verbal intelligence.  
 
4.1 Methods 
4.1.1 Participants 
Thirty-two male adolescents (16 with ASD and 16 TD) took part in Experiment 3. Inclusion 
and matching criteria were identical to those used in Experiments 1 and 2 (see Tables 1 and 
2 for detailed information). 
 
4.1.2 Materials 
The same material as presented in Experiment 2 was used.  
 
4.1.3 Procedure 
The experiment started with the instructions for the Counting task:  
 
You’re going to listen to two men talking and you will have to count the number of 
times you hear the letter “T” in what they say. You need to pay close attention as 
the two men in the game sometimes talk quite fast. 
 
This was followed by a four trial training phase. After this phase, the second task (the 
Emotion task) was introduced: 
 
Your second job is to decide how Ben feels. Do you remember how Ben felt in what 
we just listened to? Did Ben sound tired or happy? For the next examples, you will 
 see two sentences describing how Ben could possibly feel and you will need to 
choose the best one. For example, there could be a sentence saying that Ben is 
tired because he worked too hard and another sentence saying that Ben is happy 
because he got a nice present. One sentence will be written in red and one 
sentence will be written in blue. If you think the best description is the red one, 
press the RED button, if you think the best description is the blue one, press the 
BLUE button. Now we are going to practice a little more and then the real game will 
start. Remember to count the Ts in what you hear. 
 
These instructions were followed by a second training phase including two trials. The 
experimental phase then started, and followed the same procedure as in Experiments 1 and 
2. Throughout the whole procedure, participants were asked to say the number of Ts out 
loud and the experimenter recorded her answer. The emotion question then appeared on the 
computer and the participant provided her answer by pressing the appropriate key.  
 
4.2.1 Results Task 1: Counting Ts 
A mixed repeated measures ANOVA was performed with the within subjects factor “Actual 
number of Ts” (2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8) and the between subjects factor Group (TD, ASD). The 
dependent variable was the number of Ts that were detected by the participants. The 
analysis revealed no main effect of Group, F (1,30) = 0.50, p = .49; r² = .016, and a main 
effect of the Actual number of Ts on participants’ answers, F (5,150) = 27.84, p < .00001; r² 
= .48. This main effect indicates that the number of Ts detected by participants varied 
depending on the actual number of Ts present in the utterance (see Figure 3). However, the 
absence of a main effect of Group indicates that ASD and TD participants performed 
similarly. In other words, it appears that both groups were equally involved in the Counting 
Ts task.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
4.2.2 Results Task 2: External and mental states recognition 
As observed before, manners of speech were easiest to detect (Mean = 95.3), followed by 
the other categories requiring no mindreading (Physical states Mean = 85.9; Basic Emotions 
Mean = 90.0). The categories requiring first or second order ToM were hardest (Social 
Emotions Mean = 76.6; 2nd Order Mental States Mean = 76.6) (see Figure 4). As in 
Experiments 1 and 2, a Spearman rank order correlation confirms the existence of a gradual 
decrease of performance as the complexity of mentalising increases, r = -.33; p < .0001.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
The ANOVA reveals a main effect of Prosodic-Cue, F(4,120) = 6.2, p < .001; r² = .17, but  no 
significant main effect of the group, F (1,30) = 0.02, p = .90; r² = .0005, and no Prosodic-Cue 
X Group interaction, F (4,120) = 0.36, p = .84; r² = .012. As in Experiments 1 and 2, a strong 
correlation was found between ASD and TD participants’ performance, r = 0.67; p < .0001; r² 
= 0.44, which indicates similar patterns of successes and difficulties.  
 
The analysis of reaction times reveals a main effect of Prosodic-Cue, F(4,116) = 5.74, p < 
.001; r² = .17, and, in contrast to what had been found previously, a main effect of group, F 
(1,29) = 9.89, p < .01; r² = .25, due to ASD participants being slower than TD participants 
(ASD Mean = 7074 ms; TD Mean = 5081 ms; Tukey test: p < 005.). There was no Group X 
Prosodic Cue interaction, F (4,116) = 0.62, p = .65; r² = .020, which suggests that ASD 
participants were slower overall but were not especially impaired in the ToM conditions.  
 
Finally, we found that global performance and reaction times did not correlate with BPVS 
scores in the ASD group, r = 0.25; p = .35; r² = .06 and r = 0.18; p = .50; r² = .03, 
 respectively. In the TD group, this correlation was marginally significant for both measures, r 
= 0.48; p = .07; r² = .23 for accuracy rates, and r = 0.47; p = .07; r² = .22 for reaction times. 
 
4.3 Discussion 
In Experiment 3, we tested participants’ ability to identify vocal cues whilst they were 
engaged in a highly demanding secondary task. In this new task, we replicated the results 
found in the previous two experiments: ASD participants were as accurate as the controls; 
they had the same pattern of strengths and deficits; finally, performance did not correlate 
with measures of verbal intelligence in either group. There was even a trend in the opposite 
direction, with a marginally significant correlation in the TD group only. The prediction 
regarding reaction times was also not verified, since ASD participants were not specifically 
slowed down in conditions requiring mindreading. Instead, ASD participants were slower in 
all conditions, which suggests that when placed under cognitive load, participants with ASD 
have difficulties identifying vocal cues in general, independently of underlying mindreading 
requirements.  
 
5. General discussion 
In this paper, we used prosody as a test case for the ToM account of autism. We argued that 
the various types of cues conveyed in the voice call up ToM to a varying degree, ranging 
from simple physical states, to social emotions or more complex cues that require a full 
fledged ToM. We presented a series of three experiments designed to assess whether 
participants with an ASD are more impaired in processing vocal cues that rely on ToM. With 
this goal in mind, we proposed a set of categories by distinguishing cues that require various 
levels of mentalising, and compared performance in ASD participants and TD participants. 
Contrary to the predictions of the ToM account, ASD participants were not specifically 
impaired in conditions requiring higher order mindreading skills. In Experiment 1, ASD and 
TD participants had similar accuracy rates and reaction times across all conditions, and they 
displayed the same pattern of strengths and difficulties. This was confirmed in Experiment 2 
despite the increased demands imposed by the dual task. Finally, in Experiment 3, ASD 
participants showed no ToM-specific impairment in a highly demanding dual task. On the 
contrary, we observed that they were slower than TD participants in all conditions, which 
suggests that, when placed under high cognitive load, they have difficulties identifying vocal 
cues in general, independently of underlying mindreading requirements.  
 
Taken together, this absence of a specific impairment in conditions related to ToM suggests 
that our sample of ASD participants is capable of genuinely reading the mind in the voice. 
However, the overall slow-down in reaction times observed in Experiment 3 indicates that 
they have difficulty making use of vocal cues in challenging situations. This is in line with 
numerous findings highlighting the gap between their performance in structured 
experimental tasks and in real life situations (for a review, see Klin, 2003). Real-life social 
situations are especially demanding because many crucial social cues are made available in 
parallel and need to be rapidly integrated in order to make sense of the situation. This might 
also explain some of the discrepancies between experimental results demonstrating no 
emotion recognition deficit (see e.g., Adolphs, 2001; Boucher, et al., 2000; Buitelaar, et al., 
1999; Loveland, et al., 1997) and the actual experience of people with autism in their daily 
life. There is indeed an important difference between experimental settings where one is 
explicitly told to look out for emotional cues and complex social environments providing no 
guidance as to what should be attended to. In real life then, “the individual needs to go about 
defining a social task as such by paying attention to, and identifying, the relevant aspects of 
a social situation prior to having an opportunity to use their available social cognitive 
problem-solving skills” (Klin, 2003, p. 347). In sum, our own results confirm that people with 
autism have difficulties dealing with emotional cues in challenging contexts; yet they 
undermine the idea that impaired ToM is at the core of this deficit.  
 
 In line with this conclusion, previous studies on vocal cue recognition do not seem to 
highlight specific deficits in items linked to ToM. In the original Reading the mind in the voice 
task, for instance, Rutherford et al. (2002) found deficits in basic emotion items (e.g. joyous 
vs. scared) but control-like performances on some social emotion items (e.g. disappointed 
vs. apologetic) or speaker’s attitudes (e.g. sarcastic vs. indifferent). Interestingly, when more 
foils were added in the revised version of the task (Golan, et al., 2007), performance in the 
ASD group became worse. But again, the worsening was not specific to ToM related 
emotions: indeed, performance remained identical for some social emotions (e.g. worried or 
apologetic) but worsened for some physical state items (e.g. nervous) or some basic 
emotion items (e.g. terrified). In another study, Golan et al. (Golan, et al., 2006) also point 
out that there was no difference between the autism and control groups in the recognition of 
empathy. Equally surprising was the lack of difference in recognizing mental states such as 
“appalled”, which is a social emotion. As the authors mention, these results suggest that 
“mindblindness” is by no means total. Conversely, the claim that the emotion recognition 
deficit is not specific to ToM is in line with findings indicating impairments in basic emotion 
recognition (see e.g., Celani, Battacchi, & Arcidiacono, 1999; Deruelle, Rondan, Gepner, & 
Tardif, 2004; Hobson, 1986; Hobson, et al., 1988; Loveland, et al., 1995). As noted above, 
however, people with ASD are sometimes capable of displaying control-like performances, 
which suggests that the underlying competence to recognize emotions is there, but might be 
blocked by some other factor.  
 
Children and adolescents with autism do indeed show various signs of emotional 
understanding: they recognize emotional expressions in certain contexts, they refer to 
complex emotions such as pride or embarrassment at the same rates as their typically 
developing peers, and they acknowledge that emotional states in others influence their 
behaviour (for a review, see Begeer, Koot, Rieffe, Meerum Terwogt, & Stegge, 2008). What 
particularly distinguishes them from matched controls is their lack of spontaneous bias 
towards seeking social cues and the peculiar nature of their comments on emotions, which 
have been described as idiosyncratic, underinformative, scripted or lacking pragmatics and 
references to social causes (for a review, see Begeer, et al., 2008). In a related fashion, 
results from a different study indicate that children with Asperger Syndrome are able to 
understand facial cues of emotion but are less likely to seek them in more demanding 
affective processing tasks (Grossman, et al., 2000). 
 
The main deficit, then, might be one of diminished social orienting or diminished social 
motivation (Dawson, Meltzoff, Osterling, Rinaldi, & Brown, 1998; Klin, 2003). People with 
autism indeed appear to be less predisposed to orient to salient social stimuli (perhaps 
because they fail to see their intrinsic rewarding value, Dawson, Webb, & McPartland, 2005; 
Dawson, Webb, Wijsman, et al., 2005) and might be less motivated to solve social problems 
(Klin, 2003). This hypothesis predicts that performance in emotion recognition tasks will be 
boosted if social orienting is enhanced by extrinsic factors. For instance, in a recent study on 
the neural correlates of irony comprehension in autism, Wang and collaborators (Wang, et 
al., 2007) compared neutral instructions (“Pay close attention”) and explicit social 
instructions (“Pay close attention to the face and voice”). They demonstrated that activity in 
the medial prefrontal cortex, which is activated when TD participants interpret ironical 
utterances, increased in the ASD group in the explicit condition. A similar effect of explicit 
instructions was also recently found in an oddball task where participants heard both speech 
and non-speech sounds. In line with previous research (Ceponiene, et al., 2003), children 
with autism had atypical ERP (Event Related Potentials) profiles in response to speech 
sounds, but not to non-speech sounds. However, this difference disappeared when 
participants were explicitly required to pay attention to the sound stream.  
 
Similarly, the processing of emotional cues in faces appears to be related to task demands. 
For instance, in a spontaneous photograph sorting task where two possible criteria – 
emotional and non emotional (e.g. the identity of the person in the photograph) – can be 
 used, individuals with (low functioning) autism often prefer non-emotional sorting criteria 
while TD participants spontaneously favour the emotional ones (Davies, Bishop, Manstead, 
& Tantam, 1994; Weeks & Hobson, 1987). However, this difference disappears when the 
emotional criterion is made relevant (i.e., “Which ones would be likely to give you a sweet?”; 
Begeer, Rieffe, Terwogt, & Stockmann, 2006). Finally, the participant’s own intrinsic 
motivation to attend to social stimuli can also be influential. For instance, Kahana-Kalman 
and Goldman (Kahana-Kalman & Goldman, 2008) demonstrated that four-year-old children 
with ASD were better at matching facial and vocal expressions of emotion when these were 
portrayed by their mother, compared to an unfamiliar adult.  
 
To conclude, our results, along with other past empirical findings, show a combination of 
competences and impairments among those with ASD which is inconsistent with the idea 
that atypical recognition of vocal cues is caused by impaired ToM. The relative ease with 
which children with ASD manage to process vocal cues also suggests that some aspects of 
emotional and pragmatic processing are spared in at least a subgroup of individuals on the 
autism spectrum. Future work will need to carefully characterise this subpopulation, the 
nature of their social deficit, and the scope of the emotional and pragmatic processes they 
can deal with. In particular, one limitation of the present study is the absence of confirmatory 
ASD diagnoses using the gold standard ADI-R and ADOS (Lord, et al., 2000). Apart from 
ensuring the validity of the diagnosis, including such clinical measures in the future would 
allow for a better characterisation of the subgroups who pass emotional and pragmatic tests.  
 
At a conceptual level, the possibility that factors such as social attention and social 
motivation play an important role is in urgent need of further empirical evidence and should 
be systematically investigated. Apart from raising important theoretical issues, this topic also 
has crucial clinical implications. If the cognitive devices that enable vocal cue recognition are 
indeed spared in autism, educational strategies should then directly tackle the motivational 
or attentional deficits which prevent people with autism from appropriately resorting to them.  
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Appendix 
Note: starred items appear in all three experiments. 
 
Stimuli included in the Manners of Speech condition 
Item 
Context – Target 
Option 1 (item 1) 
Option 2 (item 2) 
breathless / 
screaming 
Ben gets to Daisy's house for dinner. He says to Daisy: I bought some flowers for you! 
Daisy wonders why Ben is breathless. (breathless) 
Daisy wonders why Ben is screaming. (screaming) 
crying / 
stuttering 
Joey hears Ben in the garden. Ben says to Joey: There is a dog coming! 
Joey wonders why Ben is crying. (crying) 
Joey wonders why Ben is stuttering. (stuttering) 
screaming / 
whispering 
Ben comes home. He says to his Mum: I want to watch television! 
Mum wonders why Ben is screaming. (screaming) 
Mum wonders why Ben is whispering. (whispering) 
singing / 
crying 
Ally is chatting with Ben. Ben says to Ally: I don't want to go to the seaside. 
Ally wonders why Ben is singing. (singing) 
Ally wonders why Ben is crying. (crying) 
*stuttering / 
singing 
Ben is in the living room. He says to his Mum: I don't like watching television 
Mum wonders why Ben is stuttering. (stuttering) 
Mum wonders why Ben is singing. (singing) 
*whispering / 
breathless 
Ben meets Helen on the street. He says to Helen: I want to see the football match! 
Helen wonders why Ben is whispering. (whispering) 
Helen wonders why Ben is breathless. (breathless) 
 Stimuli included in the Physical States condition 
Item 
Context – Target 
Option 1 (item 1) 
Option 2 (item 2) 
cold / 
 in pain 
Ben comes back after a day skiing. He says: Oh my feet! 
Ben's feet are cold! He should have worn warmer socks. (cold ) 
Ben is in pain. He is not used to skiing anymore (in pain) 
*cold /  
in pain 
Ben was on a boat and fell out. He says: Can you come and help me? 
Ben is really cold. The water is freezing! (cold ) 
Ben is in pain. He hit his head on the boat. (in pain) 
*in pain / 
tired 
Ben’s been waiting in front of the hospital for a long time. He says: I’ve been waiting for 
two hours! 
Ben is really in pain. It hurts! (in pain) 
Ben is really tired. He needs to go to bed! (tired) 
in pain / 
tired 
Ben has been working all afternoon in the garden. He says: I couldn't do that every day! 
Ben is in pain. His back is aching. (in pain) 
Ben is very tired. He worked in the sun for too long. (tired) 
tired /  
cold 
Ben is in the kitchen with a friend. He tells her friend: I need something to drink. 
Ben is tired. He is falling asleep. (tired) 
Ben is cold. He needs to warm up. (cold ) 
tired /  
cold 
Ben is back from a long walk in the mountains. He says: I am happy to be back home! 
Ben is tired. He walked for too long. (tired) 
Ben is cold. He walked in the snow! (cold ) 
 
 Stimuli included in the Basic Emotions condition 
Item 
Context – Target 
Option 1 (item 1) 
Option 2 (item 2) 
*angry /  
sad 
Ben wants to talk to Fred but Fred is not home. He says: Fred hasn't come home yet? 
Ben is angry. When Fred gets back, he will be in trouble (angry) 
Ben is sad. He wanted to spend the evening with Fred. (sad) 
*disgusted / 
surprised 
Ben is in the underground station. He says: It smells like food. 
Ben is disgusted. That smell makes him feel sick. (disgusted) 
Ben is surprised. He didn't know there was food in that station. (surprised) 
*happy / 
disgusted 
Ben is looking at the menu in the canteen. He says: We're having tomatoes for lunch 
Ben is happy. Tomatoes are his favorite food! (happy) 
Ben is disgusted. He hates tomatoes! (disgusted) 
sad /  
scared 
Ben is at a party, he sees Frank coming towards him. He says: Frank is coming. 
Ben is sad. He knows that Frank will ask him to leave the party. (sad) 
Ben is scared. He doesn't want Frank to bully him. (scared) 
*scared / 
angry 
Ben hears a big noise from his neighbours' house. He says: What is that noise? 
Ben is scared. There might be a burglar in his neighbours' house! (scared)  
Ben is angry. He doesn't like it when his neighbours are too noisy. (angry) 
*surprised / 
happy 
Ben is looking at his diary. He says: I'm meeting with Tom today 
Ben is surprised. He had forgotten that he was meeting Tom. (surprised) 
Ben is happy. He is really looking forward to meeting Tom. (happy) 
 
 Stimuli included in the Social Emotions condition 
Item 
Context – Target 
Option 1 (item 1) 
Option 2 (item 2) 
*guilty / 
proud 
Ben is in the kitchen with his Mum. He says: I finished all the pasta! 
Ben feels guilty. He shouldn't steal food. (guilty) 
Ben is proud of himself. He never manages to finish his food. (proud) 
guilty / 
proud 
Ben's Mum asks him about his day at school. Ben says: I fought with Mark. 
Ben feels guilty. He shouldn't fight. (guilty) 
Ben feels proud. He defended the one who was bullied. (proud) 
*proud / 
sorry 
Ben has just received his exam results. He says: I came second. 
Ben is so proud. He worked so hard for that exam. (proud) 
Ben is sorry. He wanted to be 1st. (sorry) 
proud / 
sorry 
Jane's Mum wonders why Jane is not with Ben. Ben says: I told her to walk home from 
school! 
Ben is proud. He thinks he had a great idea! (proud) 
Ben is sorry. He forgot he was supposed to pick her up! (sorry) 
sorry / guilty 
Ben's dog jumps from the table onto the sofa. Ben says: I taught him that trick. 
Ben is sorry. It's quite annoying. (sorry) 
Ben feels guilty. Now the dog has broken a precious vase. (guilty) 
*sorry / 
guilty 
Clare wonders who gave her phone number to Charles. Ben says: I gave your number 
to Charles. 
Ben is sorry. He didn't know Clare wanted her number to remain secret. (sorry) 
Ben feels guilty. He should have listened to Clare. (guilty) 
 
 Stimuli included in the Second Order Mental States condition 
Item 
Context – Target 
Option 1 (item 1) 
Option 2 (item 2) 
*admiration / 
irony 
Glenn tells Phil that he decided to come by plane rather than by train. Ben says: 
How clever of you! 
Ben really thinks that Glen was quite right because the trains are always late. 
(admiration) 
Ben actually thinks that Glenn is silly because the plane takes longer than the 
train. (irony) 
*echoic quest. / 
endorsing att. 
Clara says that the film was fantastic. Ben says: Fantastic 
Ben disagrees with Clara, he didn't think the film was fantastic. (echoic 
question) 
Ben also thought the film was fantastic. (endorsing att.) 
echoic quest. / 
endorsing att. 
Vincent says that the meal was lovely. Ben says: Lovely 
Ben also thought the meal was lovely. (endorsing att.) 
Ben disagrees with Vincent, he didn't think the meal was lovely. (echoic 
question)  
*admiration / 
irony 
Dan tells Ben that he is cooking pasta tonight. Ben says: What a brilliant idea! 
Ben is actually not very excited because he is bored of pasta! (irony) 
Ben is really excited because Dan cooks pasta so well! (admiration)  
metaling. neg. / 
negation 
Ben got a book for christmas. He says: I'm not happy! 
In fact, Ben is thrilled! (metalinguistic negation) 
In fact, Ben is really sad! (negation) 
metaling. neg. / 
negation 
Ben has just dropped Lisa off at the station. He says: I'm not sad. 
In fact, Ben is very sad! (metalinguistic negation) 
In fact, Ben is really happy! (negation) 
*sincere / 
opposite 
Tristan has gone to the cinema without Ben. Ben says: I'm not angry at all. 
Ben is really not angry, he had other plans anyway. (sincere) 
Actually, Ben is angry but he doesn't want to say it. (opposite) 
sincere / 
opposite 
Steve goes to visit his friend Ben who was sick yesterday. Ben says: I'm OK don't 
worry. 
Actually, Ben is in pain but he doesn't want to say it. (opposite) 
Ben is really feeling better now. (sincere)  
 
 
 
  
  TD participants Participants with ASD  
  Mean (SD) Range Mean (SD) Range t(df); p 
Experiment 1 
N = 34 
Age 14;2 (1;7) 11;7-16;9 13;8 (1;11) 11;1-17;10 t(32) = -.86 ; p = .40 
BPVS 
score 
100 (13) 83-128 106 (20) 78-145 t(32) = 1.06 ; p = .30 
       
Experiment 2 
N = 40 
Age 13;10 (1;2) 12;7-16;2 13;8 (1;4) 11;5-16;3 t(38) = -.44 ; p = .67 
BPVS 
score 
108 (11) 86-125 110 (23) 72-145 t(38) = .38 ; p = .71 
       
Experiment 3 
N = 32 
Age 13;10 (1;1) 12;2-16;2 13;11 (1;4) 11;5-16;3 t(30) = .34 ; p = .74 
BPVS 
score 
112 (18) 86-146 118 (23) 78-159 t(30) = .85 ; p = .40 
       
 
Table 1. Participants’ age and BPVS score. 
 
 
 
Table 2. Mean threshold values (and standard deviations) for the Intensity, Duration and 
Frequency tasks. 
  TD AS t (dl) ; p 
Exp. 1 
N = 34 
Intensity – Mean (SD) 2.43 dB (1.62 dB) 2.43 dB (1.62 dB) t(32) = .38 ; p = .70 
Duration – Mean (SD) 40 ms (24 ms) 72 ms (64 ms) t(32) = 1.76 ; p = .09 
Frequency – Mean (SD) 112 Hz (82 Hz) 122 Hz (92 Hz) t(32) = .99 ; p = .33 
     
Exp. 2 
N = 40 
Intensity – Mean (SD) 2.43 dB (1.89dB) 2.43 dB (1.35 dB) t(38) = .32 ; p = .75 
Duration – Mean (SD) 48 ms (32ms) 32 ms (24 ms) t(38) = -1.84 ; p = .07 
Frequency – Mean (SD) 92 Hz (62 Hz) 72 Hz (72 Hz) t(38) = -.62 ; p = .50 
     
Exp. 3 
N = 32 
Intensity – Mean (SD) 2.70 dB (1.62 dB) 2.43 dB (1.08 dB) t(29) = -.53 ; p = .59 
Duration – Mean (SD) 40 ms (32 ms) 40 ms (48 ms) t(29) =.07 ; p = . 95 
Frequency – Mean (SD) 92 Hz (62 Hz) 92 Hz (102 Hz) t(29) = -.03 ; p = .97 
 Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1. Proportion of correct answers (left) and reaction times (right) as a function of type 
of prosodic cue and group. 
 
Figure 2. Proportion of correct answers (left) and reaction times (right) as a function of the 
type of prosodic cue and the group. 
 
Figure 3. Number of detected Ts as a function of the Actual number of Ts; results of Post 
hoc Tukey tests comparing performance across conditions (n.s. – p = n.s.; * – p < .05; ** – p 
< .005). 
 
Figure 4. Proportion of correct answers (left) and reaction times (right) as a function of the 
type of prosodic cue and the group. 
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